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Abstract: This paper critically analyses the impact of Australia’s increasingly close 
relationship with the United States. Focusing on the recently concluded ‘free trade’ deal 
and Australia’s security relationship with the US, the paper argues that the costs of this 
relationship may in fact outweigh the conventionally understood benefits – a situation 
that has potentially negative connotations for both parties. 
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Introduction 
For more than fifty years Australia’s alliance with the United States has been the 
generally uncontroversial mainstay of Australia’s strategic and foreign policy. In the 
aftermath of September 11, however, and partly as a consequence of Australia’s 
prominent position in the ‘coalition of the willing’ that invaded Iraq, the alliance has 
been subjected to more critical scrutiny. For the first time in recent history, clear 
divisions have opened up between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal-
National coalition government of John Howard. Nor has debate been confined to the 
merits of the strategic dimensions of the relationship: the ‘free trade’ agreement 
negotiated between the US and Australia also had the effect of subjecting the 
economic side of the relationship to new, unaccustomed criticism. In short, and 
despite continuing bipartisan affirmation of the continuing importance of relationship, 
bilateral ties have become more controversial, and their merits more contested than 
ever before. 
 
Although Australia is not strictly part of East Asia,1 it provides an illuminating 
counterpoint to the Asian case studies in this volume. The Australian case highlights a 
number of issues that are pertinent to the more broadly conceived ‘Asia-Pacific’ 
region, which includes both the US, Australia and East Asia. Indeed, one of the things 
that a consideration of the Australia-US bilateral relationship in a regional context 
reveals is that bilateral relations have implications for other relationships and need to 
be seen in a broader context. This is especially true of a ‘middle power’ like Australia, 
which finds itself caught between strategic obligations toward its hegemonic ally on 
the one hand, and the reality of its regionally-determined economic future on the 
other. In such circumstances, balancing possibly competing regional and bilateral ties, 
as well as economic and strategic imperatives, has proved a major challenge; it is not 
one that has always been handled well. 
 
The discussion of US-Australia relations is organized in the following way. First, I 
briefly sketch the historical evolution of the relationship and the assumptions that 
have generally made it a sacrosanct part of Australian foreign policy. Next, I detail the 
quite distinct, but interconnected debates that have revolved around the strategic and 
economic dimensions of the relationship. In the course of this discussion I consider I 
the different positions that have emerged toward the relationship since September 11, 
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and  the impact of recent events on Australia’s relationship with its Asian neighbors 
and with the US itself. The point that emerges from this analysis is that in the 
evolving, post-Cold War environment in which global and regional processes are 
helping to redefine ‘national interests’, it is no longer clear that ‘Australian’ interests 
are as closely bound up with or served by a close, uncritical relationship with an 
increasingly assertive, unilateral hegemonic power. 
 
Great and Powerful Friends 
 
All nations are different, of course, but Australia’s history and particular geo-political 
environment give it an especially distinctive place in the international scheme of 
things. Australia’s origins as a settler society and an artifact of European colonialism 
meant that it has, from its relatively recent outset, been something of an alien outpost 
of westernization and whiteness. The looming mass of ‘Asia’ and its pullulating 
populations to its north, when combined with the formidable distance from the 
‘mother country’, meant that isolation, vulnerability and anxiety were the dominant 
themes of Australia’s early domestic and foreign policies (Walker 1999). It is, 
perhaps, unsurprising  therefore, that political elites in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries might have been preoccupied with security and determined to 
maintain close relations with Britain; Britain provided the bulk of migrants to 
Australia and it was the hegemonic power of the era. What is more surprising is the 
extent and durability of this basic approach to international relations: not only did 
Australians not even take responsibility for their own foreign policy until the 
exigencies of World War II compelled it, but the tradition of cultivating good 
relations with the ‘great and powerful friend’ of the time persisted.  
  
World War II made it unambiguously clear that Britain was no longer capable or 
interested in underwriting Australia’s security. The ALP’s war time premier, John 
Curtin, had no hesitation in abruptly transferring the country’s primary strategic 
allegiance to the United States, which had assumed Britain’s former hegemonic  
mantle (Millar 1978). Such pragmatism, as we shall see, remains a hallmark of the 
present government’s foreign policy, and is rhetorically invoked to legitimate what 
has on occasion been a controversial relationship. The underlying rationale also 
remains the same: Australia is situated in a potentially unstable part of the world and 
incapable of defending itself on its own; without the support of the most powerful 
country in the world, Australia can neither afford or guarantee its own defense, the 
conventional wisdom has it. While this argument may have been compelling at the 
height of World War II when the Japanese appeared capable of invading Australia, it 
is less clear that the same logic or imperatives obtain in the current post-Cold War 
environment. Nevertheless, as far as the strategic element of the relationship is 
concerned, it continues to enjoy largely uncritical bipartisan support. 
 
The benefits and importance of the economic relationship with the US have been even 
less clear, especially when seen in historical context.  Indeed, one of the central 
dilemmas of Australian foreign policy since World War II has been reconciling its 
potentially contradictory economic and strategic goals. Whether Australian 
policymakers have liked it or not, the inescapable economic reality and consequence 
of the ‘Asian miracle’ and the concomitant rapid industrialization to Australia’s north 
has been to profoundly reconfigure Australia’s economic relations (Tweedie 1994). 
When Japan eclipsed Britain as Australia’s largest export market in 1967, it 
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symbolized a new economic order in which ‘Asia’ had become a major economic 
opportunity, rather than a poorly understood, distrusted threat. Even though the US 
has recently become Australia’s largest single economic partner, it is important to 
recognize that Australia’s most important export markets are located in Northeast 
Asia, and that the seemingly unstoppable rise of China promises to underpin 
Australia’s economic well-being in the 2000s in much the same way that Japan did for 
much of the post-war period (Walters 2004). In such circumstances, the way in which 
Australia’s potentially quite different strategic and economic imperatives are managed 
will be a crucial foreign policy challenge, and one that requires as much flexibility 
and room for maneuver as a peripheral, medium size economy can muster. The 
alliance with the US has always placed a constraint on Australian foreign policy; in 
the aftermath of September 11 and the Howard government’s enthusiastic, open-
ended support of American foreign policy, it may lock Australia into policies that are 
not necessarily in the long-term ‘national interest’, however that over-worked, 
imprecise concept is defined. 
 
The strategic calculus 
 
The strategic alliance with the US has been the central pillar of Australia’s security 
posture for more than half a century. Given Australia’s history and the US’s 
dominance of the post-World War II order this was entirely predictable. The principal 
formal expression of this relationship was the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. Despite the 
fact that generations of Australian politicians have routinely stressed its importance to 
Australia, as has been widely noted, the Treaty in fact commits the partners to do 
nothing more than ‘consult’ in the event of one side being attacked. Revealingly, the 
rather vague provisions of the Treaty were never actually activated until John Howard 
invoked it in the aftermath of September 11. In doing so he ‘assumed the greatest 
foreign policy risk of any Australian government in living memory’, according to one 
leading observer of the alliance (Tow 2004). At first blush,  there is something 
slightly preposterous about Australia coming to the aid of the world’s most powerful 
nation, but it was an action that highlighted a number of underlying strategic realities 
and assumptions about the bilateral relationship and its purported benefits. 
 
First, Australian politicians have always been willing - even enthusiastic - supporters 
of the alliance and taken pains to demonstrate their sincerity and loyalty. The 
premium for this insurance policy has generally been costly, however. In Korea, 
Vietnam, and both conflicts with Iraq, Australia has assumed a prominent position 
amongst America’s allies. While the merits of all of these conflicts are debatable, the 
significant point to emphasize is that Australia participated despite the absence of a 
direct threat to Australia itself. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the current head of 
Australia’s armed forces, General Peter Cosgrove, now considers Australia’s 
contribution to the conflict in Vietnam not to have been ‘sensible’ (cited in Beeson 
2003a: 394). What merits emphasis more generally, however, is that Australia’s 
essentially uncritical support for American foreign policy has repeatedly necessitated 
its participation in conflicts that pose little direct threat to ‘Australian interests’. On 
the contrary, not only have close relations with the US occasionally complicated the 
pursuit of exclusively Australian interests, but Australia’s prominent position in both 
the Cold War and more recent conflicts has arguably made Australia less secure than 
it otherwise might have been.2 
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The second initial point to make, therefore, is that Australia’s and America’s ‘national 
interests’ are not necessarily or inevitably congruent. In the Manichean atmosphere of 
the Cold War when the bipolar strategic order discouraged a more nuanced 
calculation or understanding of national interests and differences, this was predictable 
enough, perhaps. What is more remarkable is that in the post-Cold War environment 
many of the old assumptions about the nature of the purported security threats 
Australia faces - and the concomitant necessity for great and powerful friends - have 
undergone little change. As a series of policy documents for and by the government 
have made clear,3 though, there  are no direct, conventional threats to Australia on the 
foreseeable horizon. And yet, not only have Australian policymakers continued to 
align themselves uncritically to American foreign policy despite any obvious benefits 
for Australia’s overall security position but, as we shall see, the alliance may have 
actually made Australia less secure – and at considerable cost. 
 
The contemporary debate 
 
The current debate about the value of the military alliance with the US has primarily 
revolved around Australia’s participation in the war in Iraq. Not only is the strategic 
value of Australian participation questionable, but it has highlighted a number of 
domestic failings, questionable assumptions, and the increasingly politicized nature of 
the bilateral relationship itself. 
 
One of the reasons that the Iraq conflict has proved so contentious, both in Australia 
and elsewhere, is because the underlying rationale used to justify it has been shown to 
have been inaccurate at best, deliberatively deceitful at worst. There is no intention of 
subjecting the US’s motivations for invading Iraq to detailed scrutiny, as exhaustive 
analyses of this topic have now been developed elsewhere (see, for example, Clarke 
2004; Woodward 2004). The point to emphasize here, is that the Australian 
government’s rapid, unequivocal, and open-ended commitment to the US in the 
immediate aftermath of September 11 not only locked it into support of American 
policy before it even knew what it might be, but it revealed major shortcomings in the 
capacity and independence of Australia’s intelligence agencies. 
 
This is an especially important consideration given that one of the major justifications 
for a close strategic alliance with the US has been the purported intelligence benefits 
that flow form such a relationship, and the advantages this offers in terms of cost 
savings and security (Ball 2001). Neither of these arguments looked terribly robust as 
the ‘war on terror’ gathered pace. At the very least it was clear that the intelligence 
capacities of both the US and Australia were inadequate: not only were they unable to 
provide appropriate intelligence about the long-term rise or short-term tactics of 
Islamic militants, but they provided faulty and tendentious intelligence about the 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs that were the justification for 
the invasion of Iraq. More troubling from an Australian perspective was the fact that 
the government’s uncritical, politically-driven attitude to security issues generally and 
to the alliance in particular has led to a significant politicization of the intelligence 
gathering agencies in Australia. 
 
It is important to stress that criticisms of both government policy and of the 
politicization and quality of intelligence were not confined to some sort of mindlessly 
anti-American radical fringe – as it was frequently depicted (Sheridan 2004). On the 
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contrary, a number of conservative figures from the security and foreign policy 
establishment drew attention to both the dangers of aligning foreign policy too closely 
with the US (Harries 2004), and of creating a highly politicized intelligence service 
that was incapable of providing impartial advice (Dibb 2004). The central points these 
critics made was that not just that Australia’s reflexive, unequivocal support for 
American policy meant that it gave up potential leverage or influence as a 
consequence, but that political rather than strategic imperatives were determining the 
nature of advice from Australia’s intelligence agencies. Even Philip Flood’s limited 
investigation into Australia’s security services made it clear that, as Paul Kelly 
(2004a) put it, ‘…our public service was intimidated by its belief that Howard was 
going to war and that this shaped the tone, scope and content of its policy advice.’  
 
It was not just the intelligence services that were being politicized as a consequence of 
the war in Iraq, however: the alliance assumed a prominence and contentiousness in 
Australia’s domestic politics that it had not had since the Vietnam era. At its heart, 
this debate revolved around the costs and benefits that flowed from the alliance, and 
the question of whether it actually contributed to Australia’s overall security. Again, it 
is important to emphasize that many of the critics, like the so-called ‘group of 43’, 
which issued a statement criticizing the Howard government’s approach to both the 
alliance and the conduct of domestic security policy, were former pillars of 
Australia’s defense and foreign policy establishment (see, Karvelas 2004).  
 
The politicization of the alliance 
 
Breaking ranks in this way is a significant departure from the normally uniform 
support for the alliance. Even the ALP’s recent criticism of the US has been the 
historical exception rather than the rule. Despite newly-appointed ALP leader Mark 
Latham’s record as a strident critic of the American alliance generally and the 
competence of George W Bush in particular (Beeson 2003b), it is striking that this 
position is at odds with the overwhelming bipartisan support that has usually 
characterized attitudes toward the alliance. What is of greatest significance here is that 
the alliance was no longer portrayed as the uncontroversial bedrock of Australia’s 
overall security posture, but a an increasingly politicized potential liability that was 
influencing Australia’s domestic politics and raising questions about its contribution 
to national security. The focus for many of these tensions and differences centered on 
Latham’s pledge to withdraw Australia’s troops from Iraq. Given that Australia had 
less that 1,000 personnel in Iraq, their withdrawal would have had no material bearing 
on the outcome of the conflict. Indeed, it is important to recognize that Australian 
troops have never been a decisively militarily; their primary significance has always 
been symbolic and designed to internationalize and legitimate American foreign 
policy. In such circumstances, and in the aftermath of Spain’s withdrawal from the 
coalition of the willing’ in Iraq, Australia’s departure would be highly damaging for 
the US. 
 
It was against this background that the alliance relationship became even more 
partisan and led to the direct intervention of senior members of the Bush 
administration in Australia’s domestic politics.4 Following President Bush’s depiction 
of Latham’s commitment to pull out of Iraq as ‘disastrous’ and his fulsome 
endorsement of John Howard’s leadership, Deputy Secretary of State, Richard 
Armitage, followed up with a detailed critique of the ALP’s position, arguing that it 
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threatened to undermine the entire conflict in Iraq (Kelly 2004b). All of this came on 
top of the highly partisan interventions of the US’s ambassador to Australia, Tom 
Scheiffer, who had publicly called for the ALP to reconsider its policies at the start of 
a domestic election campaign. Somewhat surprisingly, given the Australian 
electorate’s normal lack of interest in foreign affairs and the high levels of support 
usually evinced for the alliance, a majority thought Bush was wrong to directly 
intervene in Australian politics. Equally significantly, Australians were almost equally 
divided  between those who thought the relationship with the US was ‘too close’, and 
those who thought it was ‘about right’ (Metherell and Allard 2004). What this 
suggests is that the war in Iraq in particular and the high profile, unilateralist policies 
of the Bush administration more generally, have had the same sort of impact in 
Australia as they have in other former stalwart allies and admirers of America across 
the world, that is, a diminution in support for, and the legitimacy of, American foreign 
policy (PRC 2004). 
 
The increasingly politicized nature of Australia-US relations tended to obscure other, 
arguably more fundamental questions about the strategic costs and benefits of the 
alliance. As noted earlier, no serious analyst of Australia’s strategic position, 
including the government itself, thought there was any credible conventional danger 
to Australia from other states. And yet Australia’s defense spending continued to rise 
significantly as a direct consequence of its close alliance with the US and its 
commitment to fill a ‘niche role’ in any US-led military coalition (Brown 2004). The 
purchase of Abrams tanks, air warfare destroyers designed to operate with US carrier 
groups, and an associated commitment to join the US in the development of an 
unproven, highly expensive ‘missile shield’, were major initiatives that were 
undertaken with remarkably little public debate. Not only were the technical merits of 
and rationale for these acquisitions debatable, but they had the potential to complicate 
relations with Australia’s more immediate neighbors. Indonesia expressed concern 
about the implications of Australia’s participation in the missile defense scheme and 
its stated intention to acquire cruise missiles – an issue of particular sensitivity given 
the Howard government’s emulation of a US-style doctrine of preemption in 
Southeast Asia (Fickling 2002).  
 
The question of whether Australia’s close alliance with the US had damaged relations 
with the East Asian region more generally was unclear. While the Howard 
government eventually repudiated any characterization of itself of America’s ‘deputy 
sheriff’ in the region, some of Australia’s traditional opponents in the region had been 
able to make diplomatic life difficult for Australia by highlighting its ambivalent 
position in the region (see, Beeson 2001). But the departure of Malaysia’s Mahathir 
Mohamed from the regional political stage clearly removed a major obstacle to closer 
regional ties as far as Australia was concerned, a possibility that was manifest in 
improved relations with both Malaysia and the ASEAN countries (Milner 2004). 
Similarly, the Howard government trumpeted improved ties with China and the 
signing of a long-term agreement to supply natural gas to China as evidence of the 
effectiveness of its ‘pragmatic’ approach to the region (Murphy and McBeth 2002). 
And yet the dramatic expansion of the Chinese economy highlighted an inescapable 
economic reality: East Asia remained an area of critical importance as far as 
Australia’s future economic development was concerned. The only question was how 
the economic relationships with the region would be managed.  
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It is clear that balancing potentially competing ties with the rising regional power of 
China and the extant global power of the US would be the defining foreign policy 
challenge of the 21st century for Australia. It would also be difficult to finesse – as 
Alexander Downer’s ill-judged remarks about Australia’s supposedly neutral  policy 
stance in the event of a clash between the US and China over Taiwan served to 
demonstrate (Armitage 2004). While Downer may have inadvertently given some 
insight into government thinking about Australia’s ‘nightmare scenario’, everything 
the Howard government had done since taking office in 1996 suggested that, in 
extremis, Australia would fall into line with the US.  
 
Indeed, what distinguished the Howard government from their more Asia-centric 
predecessors in the Hawke-Keating ALP governments was their determination from 
the outset to ‘revitalize’ the relationship with the US, and rebalance relations with the 
region as a consequence. While the Howard government may have benefited from the 
rise of China and the demise of Mahathir, the privileging of relations with the US – 
both strategically and economically – inevitably meant that this critical bilateral 
relationship would be expected to deliver tangible strategic and material benefits. As 
we have seen, the strategic benefits are questionable; the economic benefits are even 
less compelling. 
 
The Economic Calculus 
 
If Australia’s participation in the war in Iraq  threw the costs and benefits of the 
strategic aspects of close bilateral ties with the US into sharp relief, the negotiation of 
a bilateral ‘free trade’ agreement did the same for the economic dimension of the 
relationship. To understand why the bilateral deal is so controversial and its merits so 
contested, it is useful to place it in the context of Australia’s  recent diplomatic and 
economic history. 
 
The first point to make is that, as noted above, Australia’s major trading partners are 
located in East Asia. True, the US has recently become Australia’s single biggest 
trade partner, but it is important to note that firstly, Australia is one of a handful of 
countries that actually runs a trade deficit with the US, and secondly, that this does 
not off-set the overwhelming importance of the East Asian region when taken as a 
whole. Six of Australia’s top ten export destinations are in the region – seven if we 
include India. In other words, the initial rationale for making the US the target of a 
bilateral trade deal is questionable given the nature of Australia’s economic ties – 
even if we put aside the specifics of the deal for a moment. The point to emphasize at 
the outset is that, the possibly unfavorable terms of the bilateral deal are arguably less 
important than the longer-term damage the agreement has done to Australia’s position 
as a champion of a multilateral economic order that is arguably more in Australia’s 
long-term national interests. 
 
In this regard it is striking just what a departure the Howard government has made 
from its predecessors. Whereas the Hawke-Keating governments had championed a 
multilateral international economic order predicated on non-discriminatory trade 
liberalization as part of a thoroughgoing process that also  incorporated major 
domestic reform (Beeson and Firth 1998), from the outset the Howard government 
has emphasized the importance of bilateral agreements. While it is possible to 
question how realistic the expectations that accompanied high-profile trade initiatives 
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like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that Australia assiduously 
promoted actually were (Ravenhill 2001), what is significant is that the Howard 
government has moved away from the sort of multilateral, non-discriminatory 
approach APEC embodies. Two additional points are worth emphasizing in this 
context: first, the Howard government’s lack of enthusiasm about APEC-style 
strategies is in accord with the America’s. Indeed, the US’s ambivalence about APEC 
in particular has seriously undermined that organization’s effectiveness and 
credibility. The second point to make is that the US can use its immense economic 
leverage to achieve favorable deals with smaller partners but, as we shall see, 
Australia has no such capacity.  
 
Ann Capling (2001) has persuasively demonstrated that Australia has only ever 
achieved favorable trade deals and outcomes when it has operated through 
multilateral auspices to construct regulatory frameworks that actually discourage 
powerful countries from acting unilaterally or in ways that disadvantage smaller 
players. Moreover, Australia’s effective leadership of innovative lobby groups like the 
‘Cairns Group’ of agricultural trading nations has been compromised and diminished 
by its switch bilateralism. While it may be possible to argue that this is a ‘pragmatic’ 
coming to terms with the evolution of the international trading order, it may in fact be 
helping to entrench an order from which Australia is less likely to benefit in the long-
run – as the agreement with the US demonstrates. It is also important to recognize that 
for a small country like Australia with limited diplomatic resources, the capacity to 
negotiate endless bilateral agreements is limited (see, Ravenhill 2003). Of even 
greater concern is the possibility that, even when Australia’s trade negotiators are 
exhaustively deployed, their advice may be compromised by political imperatives and 
the necessity of delivering an economic benefit to match Australia’s strategic 
commitment. Before considering the broader implications of this possibility and the 
overall impact of close ties with the US, it is useful to consider the free trade deal in 
more detail. 
 
The ‘free trade’ deal 
 
While the Howard government’s preference for bilateralism pre-dates the 
inauguration of George W Bush’s administration, the latter’s ascendancy provided the 
opportunity for a recalibration of Australian foreign policy. Bush’s chief trade 
advisor, Robert Zoellick, was an advocate of a sort of bilaterally-focused ‘hub and 
spokes’ strategy that had historically characterized American security policy in Asia 
(Calder 2004). The motivation from an American perspective was clear enough, as 
John Ikenberry (2004b: 628) points out: 
 
Rather than operate within multilateral frameworks, the United States forges a ‘hub and 
spoke’ array of  ‘special relationships’ around the world. Countries that cooperate with 
the United States and accept its leadership receive special bilateral security and 
economic favours. More so than multilateral arrangements, ‘hub and spoke’ bilateral 
agreements allow the United States to more fully translate its power advantages into 
immediate and tangible concessions from other states - and do so without giving up 
policy autonomy. 
 
Significantly, Zoellick wanted to use the US’s superior leverage to marry strategic 
and economic goals (Capling 2004). It was within this environment that Howard 
government decided to try and obtain a free trade deal with a more ideologically 
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sympathetic US administration. The potential confluence of strategic and economic 
objectives was reinforced by the events of September 11. 
 
From the outset there was great skepticism about Australia’s ability to obtain a 
genuine free trade deal given the existence of powerful lobby groups in the US, and 
the American government’s record of subsidizing and protecting key economic 
sectors. The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, which included $US 180 billion in 
agricultural subsidies for domestic agriculture suggested this pattern was unlikely to 
change (Eccleston 2002). This was an issue of particular sensitivity given the Howard  
government’s traditional support base in rural Australia. In reality, the US’s chief 
trade negotiator openly boasted of his ability to protect American beef, dairy and 
sugar producers (Eccleston 2004). The eventual agreement confirmed this claim, 
completely excluding sugar, and providing a number of protections and safeguards for 
other agricultural sectors. Yet the nature of Australia’s trading relationship with the 
US meant that any hopes of turning around Australia’s entrenched trade deficit – over 
$A 10 billion in 2003-04 (CoA 2003) - rested on opening up those sectors of the 
American economy, like agriculture and the fast ferry industry, where Australia 
enjoyed a significant competitive advantage. 
 
Given the US’s history flouting the rule-based multilateral order when it has judged it 
in its national interest to do so (Bhagwati 1990; Tussie and Woods 2000), it was 
entirely predictable that the eventual agreement would reflect the enduring political 
and economic realities that distinguish the relationship and Australia’s marginal place 
in America’s economic scheme of things.5 What is more surprising, perhaps, is that 
given that the proposed deal had been explicitly linked to Australia’s support of the 
‘war on terror’ in particular, and the US’s increasingly unilateral foreign policy more 
generally (Hartcher 2002),  Australia’s trade negotiators were unable to extract any 
advantage or leverage as a consequence (Wallace 2004). On the contrary, and entirely 
predictably given the asymmetrical nature of bargaining processes between large and 
small players, the eventual agreement overwhelmingly locked in the preferences of 
the American side. In return for partial and interminably drawn out access to the 
American market, Australia’s negotiators offered  immediate access to Australia’s 
manufacturing and service sectors (in which the US is especially strong), agreed to 
compromise Australia’s quarantine requirements, and committed Australia to 
‘harmonizing’ its regulatory environment – something that threatened to affect 
Australia’s distinctive Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS)  (Weiss, Thurborn and 
Mathews 2004). 
 
Revealingly, the only point of contention generated by the Australian side emerged in 
the midst of an Australian election in which new ALP leader Mark Latham sought to 
differentiate himself from the coalition. Although a series of reports from supporters 
and opponents of the Agreement had made claim and counter-claim about the 
purported merits of the deal,6 most concern had revolved around its impact on the 
PBS and the capacity of American pharmaceutical companies to push up drug prices 
in a less regulated environment (Uren 2004). Despite the ALPs’ limited obduracy, 
what is most significant is that for both parties, walking away from what most 
independent observers took to be a bad deal was not an option. Despite the fact that 
the government’s own analysis of an agrement that excluded sugar suggested it might 
actually be economically negative for Australia, and despite the apparent reluctance of 
Australia’s negotiators to endorse the deal, Howard was politically committed to a 
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deal that provided legitimation for the entire bilateral relationship more generally 
(Costello 2004). As Ann Capling (2004) puts it: 
 
 …there was one reason above all why Howard was never going to allow Australia’s 
negotiators to return home empty-handed. Australia’s pursuit of the trade-agreement was 
driven by Howard’s desire to strengthen Australia’s political and strategic links with the 
United States, an objective that had assumed even greater importance with the ‘war on 
terror’…As a result, Australia has been lumbered with a trade agreement that is clearly a 
dud. 
 
Howard’s conviction that Australian foreign policy was ‘unbalanced’ and too 
‘preoccupied’ with its immediate region led to him to pursue a closer relationship 
with the US. The US  was Australia’s most important single relationship not simply 
because of its ‘strategic, economic and diplomatic power’, but ‘of equal, if not more 
significance [because of] the values and aspirations we share’ (Howard 2001). For a 
government that took pride in its hard-nosed calculation and pursuit of ‘the national 
interest’, the willingness to subordinate Australia’s economic welfare, to say nothing 
of heightening the immediate security threat to Australia, was a remarkable indication 
of just how high a price Howard was prepared to pay to secure such supposedly 
common values and aspirations. The question of whether it is a price worth paying is 
taken up in the concluding section. 
 
Concluding remarks: Hegemonic, national and other interests 
 
The key assumption underpinning the Howard government’s approach to foreign 
policy generally and the bilateral relationship with the US in particular, is that 
Australian and American interests are essentially congruent. The key assumption is 
that, while there may be short-term costs associated with demonstrating a continuing 
commitment to that relationship as far as Australia is concerned, the long-term pay-
offs justify such sacrifices. Strikingly, this is a position that has generally enjoyed 
fairly uncritical, bilateral support in Australia, and despite Mark Latham’s recent, 
much publicized criticisms of both American foreign policy and George W, Bush, this 
has not changed – as the ALP has been at pains to emphasize (Rudd 2003). And yet, 
as we have seen, in both key areas of the bilateral relationship – security and 
economic relations – the merits of the deal for ‘Australia’ are debatable at best. 
 
At one level, this is a consequence of deciding precisely what the ‘national interest’ 
actually is in an era of cross border economic integration, and potentially competing 
domestically- and externally-oriented economic interests. The potential conflicts such 
enduring, structurally-entrenched economic realities generate was clearly revealed in 
both the effectiveness of powerful  sectoral interests to lobby  the Bush 
administration, and the similar difficulty the Howard government faced in achieving a 
deal that satisfied all producer groups and industry lobbies in Australia. In the end, of 
course, given a genuine free trade deal was impossible, the government chose to 
compensate directly some of the squeakier wheels in the agricultural sector. 7 
 
Yet even if the Howard government was able to buy-off disaffected domestic 
interests, the benefits of the deal remain highly contentious when seen in the context 
of Australia’s broader foreign and economic policies. At the very last, the fact that the 
US was unwilling to make even minor concessions to  one of its closest allies and 
supporters should have alerted the Howard government to the dangers of negotiating 
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bilaterally with a far more powerful partner, especially one that is especially 
responsive to its own domestic pressure groups and sectoral interests. More 
fundamentally, though, Australia’s limited diplomatic capacities, and its historical 
reliance on a rules-based international trading regime that actually discouraged the 
powerful from exploiting the weak ought to have given pause about the long-term 
implications of an increasingly bilateral international order. Not only had Australia 
effectively compromised its surprisingly effective, high-profile leadership role as a 
champion of multilateralism and trade liberalization, but some argued it also 
threatened to further alienate Australia from its immediate regional neighbors 
(Garnaut 2003). 
 
As noted earlier, Australia’s closer alignment with the US has proved far from fatal 
for regional relations, partly as a consequence of Mahathir’s disappearance, and partly 
because other regional leaders are pragmatically seeking closer ties with an American 
power that remains a decisive force in the region’s wider strategic calculations. And 
yet, it is not clear that the Howard government’s good fortune will hold. In the event 
of the US taking a more aggressive attitude toward North Korea, the regional ‘war on 
terror’, or – even more consequentially – China, it is not clear how Australia should 
react, or how its ‘national interest’ would be served or defined. China has rapidly 
becoming the mainstay of Australia’s recent economic expansion, and any conflict 
between China and the US would present Australia with an invidious choice between 
the apparent guarantors of its economic and military security. 
 
Not only would such a situation highlight potentially quite different Australian and 
American interests, but it would (or ought to) raise the question of whether the 
alliance was actually a reliable and cost-effective  basis for Australia’s domestic 
security. It is worth remembering that Australia has faced no direct threat (other than 
the remote prospect of a nuclear strike against the joint facilities during the Cold War) 
since the Second World War. And yet despite enjoying what is arguably the most 
strategically begin position in the world, generations of Australian leaders have felt 
compelled to fight alongside the US in conflicts that pose no immediate danger to 
Australia. This pattern continues with Australia’s participation in the war in Iraq. The 
only significant consequence of this conflict for Australia appears to have been a 
heightened consciousness of Australia as a potential target in the minds of 
international terrorists (Goodsir 2003). The contrast with New Zealand, which has not 
be threatened with terrorist attacks (or invasion) since being expelled from the 
American security umbrella is striking. 
 
None of this is to suggest that threats to international stability do not need to be 
confronted, or that Australia has no part to play in such efforts. The question is how 
such threats are to addressed. It is not necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
logic that underpinned the decision to invasion of Iraq or the conduct of the ‘war on 
terror’ to realize that on the one hand, egregious mistakes and miscalculations have 
been made, and that on the other, the Bush administration has been pursuing what it 
takes to be in its national interests, with little consideration of its impact on the wider 
international system. It remains to be seen whether the doctrine of preemption which 
the US has developed - and which Australia has supported and echoed in a regional 
context – will continue to be pursued in the Bush administration’s second term, or 
whether the high water mark of unilateralism has already been passed (Ikenberry 
2004a). Either way, and despite Australia’s inability to ever materially influence the 
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outcome of the conflicts it participates in on such a regular basis, its uncritical, open-
ended support has clearly played a small but important role in legitimating American 
actions and its concomitant repudiation of multilateralism. 
 
Given that both the legitimacy and efficacy of America’s recent foreign policy have 
become deeply intertwined parts of an increasingly contentious whole (Tucker and 
Hendrickson 2004), Australia’s uncritical support in encouraging what have proved to 
be ill-judged adventures on dubious bases is all the more noteworthy. It is possible to 
argue that a less uncritical position on Australia’s part may have given the US a 
moment’s pause for thought, although it is difficult to imagine that the US would have 
acted otherwise given the long-held desire of the Bush administration to effect regime 
change in Iraq (Mann 2004). Notwithstanding Australia’s limited capacity to 
influence the actions of the world’s only superpower, the crucial question for 
countries like Australia is what sort of international order best suits their long-term 
national interests, however they are perceived. Australia, like the majority of the 
countries of East Asia, has prospered under the multilateral order that the US was 
instrumental in creating in the aftermath of the Second World War. The contemporary 
order is very different and promises to exert very different regional and bilateral 
effects (Beeson forthcoming). To judge from Australia’s recent experience, the 
benefits of the new order are contentious at best. To calculate the ‘national interest’ 
on the basis of politicized intelligence, questionable economic and strategic 
assumptions, and the pursuit of values that are not necessarily widely shared 
internationally or even with Australia itself, is to risk replicating an historical pattern 
that has limited Australian autonomy and locked it into commitments that are 
subsequently seen as unwise. It is also to risk politicizing a bilateral relationship that 
clearly remains Australia’s most important, but one that is in need of less reflexive, 
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1 Interestingly, this is despite the best efforts of former foreign minister Gareth Evans who, at the hight 
of the ALP’s pursuit of ‘engagement’ with Asia argued that Australia should be considered part of an 
East Asian hemisphere. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug 17, 1995: 26. 
2 The ‘joint facilities’ at Pine Gap and elsewhere in Australia were key part of the US’s strategic  
posture and clearly made Australia a nuclear target during the Cold War. See  
Ball, Desmond (1980) A Suitable Piece of Real Estate : American Installations in Australia, Sydney: 
Hale & Iremonger. 
3 There have been numerous review and inquiries into Australia’s defence polices. One of the common 
features has been that Australia does not face any serious, credible conventional threat of invasion or 
direct attack in the foreseeable future. See, for example, CoA (2000). 
4 Significantly, Howard returned the favour for Bush, endorsing his presidency during the US elections 
and potentially compromising Australia’s relationship with any Kerry administration. See Allard 
(2004). 
5 Australia is the US 14th biggest export market, representing 1.8% of overall exports, and its 30th 
biggest source of imports, at only 0.5% of total imports. See CoA (2003). 
6 The tendentious nature of the reports was highlighted by the fact that the Howard government’s 
preferred economic modeller – the Centre for International Economics – made completely unrealistic 
assumptions about the possibility of achieving completely free trade in agriculture and an unchanged 
regulatory environment in Australia to support its claims about the alleged benefits of the deal. Neither 
of these claims is plausible and according to a Senate inquiry report the benefit looks to be in the order 
of $A53 million – ‘a tiny harvest from a major political and bureaucratic endeavour’, according to the 
report’s author (quoted in Capling 2004). 
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7 The Howard government offered $444 million (about $70,000 for each producer) to Australia’s sugar 
producers to compensate them for their exclusion from the deal. See Capling (2004). 
